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People v. Williams and Haynes: A New York Supreme Court
concludes that pretextual traffic stops violate the New York State
Constitution
Freedom from unreasonable searches' and seizures ' is
among the most precious rights possessed by citizens of the
United States of America.3 Both the United States Constitution4
1 Since the term "search" is not readily defined, for an extensive discussion of
the topic, see 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDmENT § 2.1(a) (2d ed. 1987). The traditional meaning of the term
"search" is:
some exploratory investigation, or an invasion and quest, a looking for or
seeking out. The quest may be secret, intrusive, or accomplished by force,
and it has been held that a search implies some sort of force, either actual
or constructive, much or little. A search implies a prying into hidden places
for that which is concealed and that the object searched for has been bid-
den or intentionally put out of the way. While it has been said that ordi-
narily searching is a function of sight, it is generally held that the mere
looking at that which is open to view is not a "search."
Id. at 301-02 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109,
113 (1984) ("A 'search' occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is pre-
pared to consider reasonable is infringed."); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906)
(defining search as ordinarily implying "a quest by an officer of the law").
2 "A 'seizure' of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference
with an individual's possessory interests in that property." Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at
113; see also Hale, 201 U.S. at 76 (stating that "seizure contemplates a forcible dis-
possession of the owner").
Under the Fourth Amendment a person is seized if, "in view of all of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that
he was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). For
a general discussion of seizure, see 1 LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 2.1(a).
'See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) ("The security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of or-
dered liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through the Due Process
Clause."); In re Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 250 (N.D. Cal. 1887) ("Of all the
rights of the citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace
and happiness than the right of personal security .... Without the enjoyment of this
right, all other rights would lose half their value."). For the historical background
underlying the search and seizure provision contained in the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, see 1 LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 1.1. See generally
MELVYN ZARR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE POLICE 19-24 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing
Fourth Amendment); 1 JOSEPH G. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
(2d ed. 1985) (providing an in depth analysis of Fourth Amendment).
4 The search and seizure provision of the Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
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and the New York State Constitution specifically prohibit in-
trusive6 governmental searches and seizures.7 Although the fed-
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The leading case on the subject of Federal Constitutional search and seizure,
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), states that freedom from unreason-
able searches and seizures "affect[s] the very essence of constitutional liberty and
security ... [and] appl[ies] to all invasions on the part of the government and its
employ6s [sic] of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." Id.
The Fourth Amendment protects this fundamental right by requiring a warrant
before a valid search can be conducted. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390
(1985). There are, however, exceptions to this rule. See, e.g., Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (establishing "automobile exception" because of
ability to expeditiously move vehicles out of jurisdiction where warrant must be se-
cured).
r N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 12. The search and seizure provision of the New York
State Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Id.; see also Matthew M. Weissman, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 299, 337-47
(1991) (explaining development of New York's search and seizure jurisprudence).
8 A search and seizure is considered intrusive if it is not predicated on probable
cause. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (recognizing that searches
ordinarily require probable cause). Probable cause, as traditionally defined, exists
"[i]f the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of
prudence and caution in believing that an offence has been committed." Stacey v.
Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878). In Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959),
the Court added that good faith on the part of the arresting officer is insufficient to
establish probable cause. For a general discussion of probable cause, see 1 CooK,
supra note 3, § 3:10, at 391-402 and 1 LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 3.1.
7 Constitutional protection from unreasonable searches and seizures generally
restricts only governmental action. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
487-88 (1971) (noting policy of Fourth Amendment is such that private citizens are
not bound by same restraints as government and citizen's arrest may be upheld
even though same action by governmental agent would violate Fourth Amendment);
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (holding that Fourth Amendment
applies only to governmental action and stating that "history clearly show[s] that it
was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not
intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies"); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914) (stating that Fourth Amendment limits
federal officials, in exercise of their power and authority, from engaging in unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, and is obligatory upon all officials of federal system);
People v. Gleeson, 36 N.Y.2d 462, 465, 330 N.E.2d 72, 74, 369 N.Y.S.2d 113, 116
(1975) (indicating that search and seizure provisions of United States and New York
Constitutions are directed at governmental activity); People v. Horman, 22 N.Y.2d
378, 381, 239 N.E.2d 625, 627, 292 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876-77 (1968) (emphasizing that
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eral and New York search and seizure provisions are virtually
identical,8 and have been interpreted by most courts as coexten-
sive,9 some courts have held that the New York State provision
provides a greater degree of protection than its federal counter-
part.0 Recently, in People v. Williams and Haynes," the New
Fourth Amendment and article I, section 12 of New York Constitution prohibit un-
lawful searches and seizures by governmental officials, not private individuals);
Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 43-44, 203 N.E.2d 481, 483, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85
(1964) (discussing long held proposition that Fourth Amendment and article I, sec-
tion 12 do not proscribe nongovernmental intrusions); 1 COOK, supra note 3, § 2.38,
at 260 (stating that "[tlhe protection of the Fourth Amendment ... is understood to
be a restriction only on governmental action").
' See supra notes 4-5. New York may have been the last state to enact a search
and seizure provision when, in 1938, it took article I, section 12 verbatim from the
Fourth Amendment. Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Princi-
ple, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 399, 416 (1987). The only difference between the search
and seizure provisions of the Federal and New York Constitutions is that the New
York Constitution contains an additional provision against the unreasonable search
and seizure of its citizens' communications. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 ("he right of
the people to be secure against unreasonable interception of telephone and tele-
graph communications shall not be violated."); see People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474,
486, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1335, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920, 927 (1992) (pointing out absence of
this provision in Fourth Amendment); see also People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 57,
432 N.E.2d 745, 749, 447 N.Y.S.2d 873, 877 (1982) (Gabrielli, J., concurring) ("The
operative language of section 12 of article I of our State Constitution is identical to
the language of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution."); People
v. Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160, 165, 429 N.E.2d 735, 737, 445 N.Y.S.2d 57, 59 (1981)
(stating that article I, section 12 of New York Constitution and Fourth Amendment
of Federal Constitution are same and "this identity of language supports a policy of
uniformity in both State and Federal courts").
' See People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 304, 501 N.E.2d 556, 561, 508
N.Y.S.2d 907, 912 (1986) (discussing judicial restraint from different interpretation
of article I, section 12 and Fourth Amendment); People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398,
406, 488 N.E.2d 439, 445, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 624 (1985) (highlighting consistent in-
terpretation of seizure provisions of New York and Federal Constitutions); Ponder,
54 N.Y.2d at 165, 429 N.E.2d at 737, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 59 (emphasizing identical lan-
guage of New York and federal search and seizure provisions); see also Kaye, supra
note 8, at 416-17 (stating that, for many years, New York Court of Appeals followed
policy of uniformity with federal courts' Fourth Amendment precedents).1 A state can extend more protection to its citizens under its constitution than
is provided by the Federal Constitution; courts have done so with search and seizure
law when doing so "best promotes 'predictability and precision in judicial review of
search and seizure cases and the protection of the individual rights of our citizens.'"
P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 304, 501 N.E.2d at 561, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 913 (citation omit-
ted); see Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 486, 593 N.E.2d at 1335, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 927 (rejecting
federal "open fields" doctrine, thus granting New York citizens more protection);
People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 437, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 1053, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702, 704
(1991) (noting that state courts may give its citizens more protection than Supreme
Court); People v. Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d 19, 21, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1055, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388,
389 (1990) (holding that, unlike Fourth Amendment, canine sniff constitutes search
under article I, section 12 of New York Constitution); People v. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d
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York State Supreme Court, Bronx County, reaffirmed this higher
level of protection, and further clarified the distinction between
state and federal search and seizure jurisprudence.' The court
concluded that the New York State Constitution prohibits police
officers from using traffic violations as a pretext to stop vehicles
in order to investigate possible unrelated offenses for which no
reasonable suspicion exists.13
Defendants, Williams and Haynes, were observed entering a
livery cab late at night by two New York City police officers pa-
trolling in an unmarked car.'4 Shortly thereafter, the officers
stopped the cab after it" 'made an abrupt turn [at an angled in-
tersection] ... without signaling.' "'" One officer testified that
they had pulled the car over on the basis of the traffic violation
and for "other things."6 Upon the police officer's request, the
driver produced his car registration, and the defendants then
agreed to step out of the car.' While both defendants stood at
the rear of the cab speaking to one of the officers, the cab driver
informed the other officer that the defendants had " 'dropped
something' and that he should take a look under the seat."8 The
officer found a hand-gun hidden under the front passenger seat.19
Both defendants were arrested and, upon conducting a routine
search at the precinct, the police recovered twenty-four packages
of cocaine from Williams.0 Williams and Haynes were each in-
dicted for criminal possession of a weapon; Williams was also
charged with drug possession.2'
The Supreme Court, Bronx County, held that the state had
224, 227-29, 543 N.E.2d 61, 63, 544 N.Y.S.2d 796, 798 (1989) (rejecting federal
courts' expansive view of "stop and frisk" procedures in automobile situations).
" People v. Williams and Haynes, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 5, 1996, at 29 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County July 8, 1996).
See id. at 29, col. 2 (discussing New York's permissible expansion of Federal
Constitutional rights).
Id. at 29, cols. 2-3.
'4 Id. at 29, col. 1.
"Id.
' Williams and Haynes, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 5, 1996, at 29, col. 1. The officer testi-
fied that "there might have been something wrong in the cab and that is why he
stopped it, 'to find out if there was a crime committed.' "Id.
"7 Id. There was a factual dispute as to whether the police officers immediately
asked Mr. Windlay, the cab driver, for his license and registration. Id. The driver
claimed they did not. Id.
8 Williams and Haynes, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 5, 1996, at 29, col. 1.
'
9 Id. at 29, col. 2.
20 Id.
2 Id. at 29, col. 1.
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not sustained its initial burden of showing the legality of the offi-
cers' conduct.' Accordingly, it granted the defendants' motion to
suppress all evidence recovered at the scene and at the pre-
cinct.' Although the court acknowledged that an officer may
stop a vehicle if he or she has a "reasonable suspicion"24 that the
Vehicle and Traffic Law has been violated,' it found that no
traffic law had, in fact, been violated because no signal was nec-
essary to make the disputed turn." Thus, the court concluded
that the stop was unlawful and, therefore, suppressed the evi-
Id. (citing People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361, 367, 270 N.E.2d 709, 713, 321
N.Y.S.2d 884, 889 (1971)). "[Though a defendant who challenges the legality of a
search and seizure has the burden of proving illegality, the People are nevertheless
put to the burden of going forward to show the legality of the police conduct in the
first instance.' " Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d at 367, 270 N.E.2d at 713, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 889
(alteration in original) (quoting People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86, 91 n.2, 209 N.E.2d
694, 698 n.2, 262 N.Y.S.2d 65, 71 n.2 (1965), rev'd, 19 N.Y.2d 262, 225 N.E.2d 748,
279 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1967)); see People v. Baldwin, 25 N.Y.2d 66, 70, 250 N.E.2d 62, 63-
64, 302 N.Y.S.2d 571, 573-74 (1969) (stating that to make prima facie case in sup-
pression hearing People must, in first instance, come forward with some evidence to
show probable cause).
23Williams and Haynes, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 5, 1996, at 29, col. 2.
24Reasonable suspicion is defined as "the quantum of knowledge sufficient to
induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious man under the circumstances to believe
criminal activity is at hand." People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 112-13, 324 N.E.2d
872, 877, 365 N.Y.S.2d 509, 516 (1975). Reasonable suspicion must be grounded in
some demonstrable root, and cannot be based on a mere "hunch" or "gut reaction."
People v. Sobotker, 43 N.Y.2d 559, 564, 373 N.E.2d 1218, 1220, 402 N.Y.S.2d 993,
996(1978).
2 Williams and Haynes, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 5, 1996, at 29, col. 2 (citing People v.
Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 419, 330 N.E.2d 39, 43, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67, 74 (1975) (addressing
necessity of officers' reasonable suspicion that violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law
had been committed)).
It should be noted that when the police temporarily detain an automobile, "even
if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose," it is considered a seizure of per-
sons and is subject to constitutional requirements. See Whren v. United States, 116
S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); Ingle, 36
N.Y.2d at 419, 330 N.E.2d at 43, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 74 (holding that routine traffic stop
is impermissible unless there is reasonable suspicion of violation of Vehicle and
Traffic Law). Thus, it is unconstitutional for the police to arbitrarily stop vehicles.
Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d at 419, 330 N.E.2d at 43, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 74. As a general matter,
however, such a "seizure" is not unreasonable where the police have probable cause
to believe a traffic violation has occurred. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 655.
2 Williams and Haynes, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 5, 1996, at 29, col. 2. New York law re-
quires an appropriate signal be given at an intersection to evidence a driver's intent
to make a turn. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1163 (McKinney 1996). The court con-
cluded, based on testimony from one of the officers and the cab driver that, although
technically an intersection, the action in question was not really a "turn." Williams
and Haynes, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 5, 1996, at 29, col. 2. As such, the court concluded that a
signal was unnecessary and a traffic violation had not occurred. Id.
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dence against the defendants.27
The court hypothesized, however, that even if a traffic in-
fraction had occurred, the officers' conduct still would have vio-
lated the New York State Constitution.28 Citing several New
York precedents, the court stated that "[tihe police may not use
traffic violations as a mere pretext to investigate the defendant
on an unrelated matter."9 The court found that although the of-
ficers did believe a traffic violation had occurred, they had
merely used it as a pretext30 and instead acted on a "gut reac-
tion" that defendants were engaged in some form of criminal ac-
tivity.3 Since the officers' "intent was to use the traffic stop to
investigate an unrelated matter,"32 and they otherwise lacked
27 Id. at 29, col. 2. The "exclusionary rule" mandates that all illegally seized evi-
dence be suppressed, or excluded, from the courtroom. ZARR, supra note 3, at 86.
One of the primary purposes of the exclusionary rule is to deter unreasonable
searches and seizures. See People v. Cardaio, 30 A.D.2d 843, 844, 294 N.Y.S.2d 579,
582 (2d Dep't 1968) (finding that one purpose of exclusionary rule is to deter illegal
police conduct), affd as amended, 24 N.Y.2d 988, 250 N.E.2d 227, 302 N.Y.S.2d 818
(1969); 1 LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 1.1(f), at 16-20.
Williams and Haynes, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 5, 1996, at 29, col. 2.
Id. (quoting People v. David, 223 A.D.2d 551, 553, 636 N.Y.S.2d 374, 376 (2d
Dep't 1996) (citations omitted). The law in New York prohibiting the use of traffic
violations as a pretext to investigate unrelated matters is well established. See
People v. Laws, 213 A.D.2d 226, 227, 623 N.Y.S.2d 860, 861 (1st Dep't) (finding sup-
pression proper where evidence seized was fruit of pretextual stop), appeal denied,
85 N.Y.2d 975, 653 N.E.2d 631, 629 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1995); People v. Lewis, 195
A.D.2d 523, 524, 600 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273 (2d Dep't 1993) (suppressing evidence where
officer's testimony on reason for stop was not credible and seemed partially tailored
to nullify constitutional objections); People v. Smith, 181 A.D.2d 802, 803, 581
N.Y.S.2d 240, 240-41 (2d Dep't 1992) (finding stop of taxicab, based on cab's illegal
U-turn, impermissible pretext when officer admitted to following passenger for sus-
pected drug possession, failed to give cab driver summons, and failed to request li-
cense or registration); People v. Watson, 157 A.D.2d 476, 477, 549 N.Y.S.2d 27, 27
(1st Dep't 1990) (holding that traffic violations could not justify stop where officers
admitted violations were not reason for stop); People v. Llopis, 125 A.D.2d 416, 417,
509 N.Y.S.2d 135, 136 (2d Dep't 1986) (concluding that parking infraction and al-
leged speeding violation were mere pretext where officer testified he stopped car
because of occupants' reactions to his presence).
30 Williams and Haynes, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 5, 1996, at 29, col. 1. The court sup-
ported this conclusion with the officer's testimony, see supra note 17 and accompa-
nying text, the fact that the driver was not issued a traffic summons, and the
driver's testimony that his license and registration were not immediately requested.
Williams and Haynes, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 5, 1996, at 29, col. 1.
3' Id. at 29, col. 2. The court stated that the officer's observation of two black
men (the defendants) getting into a cab at 12:10 A.M. was not enough to provide the
officer with a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. Thus, the court concluded
that the officers stopped the cab because of a "mere hunch" or "gut reaction." Id.
32 Id. The court stated, "[wihen it is clear from the officer's testimony that the
reason he stopped the cab was to investigate unsupported criminal activity, and not
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any reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior, the court con-
cluded that the evidence against the defendants "must be sup-
pressed as 'the fruits of the poisonous tree.'""
In reaching this conclusion, the Williams court recognized
that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Whren v. United
States' foreclosed Federal Constitutional challenges to the rea-
sonableness of a traffic stop based upon the actual motivation of
the police officer where the officer had probable cause to believe
a traffic violation had occurred.35 In Whren, the Court concluded
that a police officer's motives were irrelevant so long as there
was probable cause to make the traffic stop and, accordingly an
inquiry into whether a traffic stop was pretextual was unneces-
sary under the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution."
The Williams court rejected this conclusion, opting instead
to follow New York Court of Appeals precedent which "stated in
dicta that 'in this State [police stops] are legal only pursuant to
routine, nonpretextual traffic checks to enforce traffic regula-
tions.' "'s Although the Williams court noted that the previous
because of a traffic violation, the stop is unjustifiable." Williams and Haynes, N.Y.
L.J., Aug. 5, 1996, at 29, col. 2.
"Id. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine provides that evidence obtained
as an indirect result of a Fourth Amendment violation is inadmissible; thus, pre-
cluding the use of evidence that would not have been obtained but for the illegal
search or seizure. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
4116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996). In Whren, as in Williams and Haynes, a traffic viola-
tion led to the arrest of defendants on an unrelated matter. Id. at 1772. Plainclothes
policemen were patrolling a high drug area in an unmarked car when they observed
a truck waiting at a stop sign for an unusually long time, "more than 20 seconds."
Id. After changing direction in order to head back toward the truck, the officers saw
the truck turn suddenly and speed off at an "unreasonable speed." Id. The officers
stopped the truck, allegedly to give the driver a warning regarding the traffic viola-
tions. Id. Upon approaching the truck, one of the officers "observed two large plastic
bags of what appeared to be crack cocaine" in the hands of one of the defendants. Id.
3- Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774.
' The Whren Court rejected the proposition that more than probable cause is
necessary before police may validly stop an individual for a traffic violation. Id.
Moreover, the Court flatly dismissed the notion that police officers' ulterior motives,
or subjective intent, could render otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 1773-75. The Court stated that, "the fact that the officer does not have
the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal jus-
tification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action." Id. (quoting Scott v. United
States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).
' People v. Williams and Haynes, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 5, 1996, at 29, col. 2 (citing
People v. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d 749, 753, 646 N.E.2d 785, 787, 622 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485
(allowing preventative "informational stops" where articulatable basis exists for the
interference), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 271 (1995)).
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New York precedents derived their holdings from cases in which
federal and state law intertwined, 8 the court nevertheless con-
cluded that New York courts had independently interpreted the
state constitution to prohibit pretextual traffic stops.39 Thus, the
Williams court based its decision solely on state constitutional
grounds.40
It is submitted that New York courts should not delve into
the subjective motivations of a police officer in making an oth-
erwise valid traffic stop where circumstances, viewed objectively,
provide justification for such action. Although a state may ex-
tend greater protection to its citizens under its constitution than
under the Federal Constitution,41 it would be a mistake to extend
such protection, in the context of traffic stops, beyond that of
probable cause.42 Such a rule would encourage courts to deter-
mine an officer's subjective motives based purely on conjecture,
because an officer is unlikely to reveal these motivations. As the
Supreme Court noted in Whren, "police manuals and standard
procedures may sometimes provide objective assistance, [but]
ordinarily one would be reduced to speculating about the hypo-
thetical reaction of a hypothetical constable-an exercise that
might be called virtual subjectivity."4" Thus, absent an admis-
sion by an offending officer, courts would need to apply some
s" Williams and Haynes, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 5, 1996, at 29, col. 3 (citing People v.
Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 420-21, 330 N.E.2d 39, 44, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67, 75 (1975) (holding
that stop of vehicle for "routine traffic check" constituted illegal seizure of vehicle)).
s9 Williams and Haynes, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 5, 1996, at 29, col. 3. The court asserted
that phrases such as "In this State" or "this Commonwealth's jurisprudence" indi-
cate that a court is interpreting the constitution of the state in which it sits. Id.
40 See id. at 29, cols. 2-3. The court noted that although state courts may not
remove rights protected by the Federal Constitution, they may interpose their own
laws to supplement those rights. Id.
41 See generally Kaye, supra note 8 (discussing extent to which state constitu-
tion should be interpreted in accordance with federal precedent dealing with identi-
cal constitutional provisions).
4 Search and seizure doctrine requires the balancing of governmental and in-
dividual interests. Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1776-77 (1996). "The
rule of probable cause is a practical, non-technical conception affording the best
compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests."
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 36 n.3 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). Usually, where there is probable cause to
believe that there has been a violation of the law, the private interest in avoiding
police contact is "outbalanc[ed]." Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1777.
'3 Id. at 1775. For a comprehensive pre-Whren decision examining the
"pretextual search doctrine," see United States v. Scopo, 814 F. Supp. 292 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (discussing "usual police practices" approach as one of two popularly used ob-
jective methods of assessing pretext), rev'd, 19 F.3d 777 (2d Cir. 1994).
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type of "reasonable officer" test to decipher the motivation for the
stop.44
Not only would the reasonable officer approach be impracti-
cal, but it also could lead to inconsistent4 and undesirable re-
sults.' As illustrated by Williams, the court could, in hindsight
and on the basis of a methodical review of the law, rationally
conclude that no infraction had occurred. At the time of the inci-
dent, however, the decision had to be made in a split second, be-
cause had the officers hesitated, the car would have been gone.
Accordingly, given facts similar to Williams, where it was not
clear whether a traffic violation had occurred, it would be error
to second guess the police officer's assessment of the situation by
applying a subjectivity test to ensure that the officer's motives
were pure.
Moreover, it is submitted that additional protection from
pretextual traffic stops is unnecessary. The underlying fear
4See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774-77 (critiquing "reasonable officer" test). Under
the "reasonable officer" test, unless the police officer admits that his or her motiva-
tion for enforcing the traffic law was a pretext to investigate an unrelated matter,
the court would need to determine whether the officer would have made the traffic
stop absent suspicion of any other criminal activity. This seemingly necessitates an
inquiry into whether a reasonable, similarly situated officer would have stopped a
defendant for the traffic violation involved. In other words, a court would need to
determine whether, based on standard police practice, it is plausible that the officer
had the proper state of mind. Id. at 1774. It is submitted that such an approach
would be extremely difficult to apply.
We might wish that policemen would not act with impure plots in mind,
but I do not believe that wish a sufficient basis for excluding, in the sup-
posed service of the [Constitution], probative evidence obtained by ac-
tions-if not thoughts--entirely in accord with ... constitutional require-
ments .... [Slending ... courts on an expedition into the minds of police
officers would produce a grave and fruitless misallocation of judicial re-
sources.
Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968) (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
4Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1775-77. As the Whren Court observed, even if the courts
could practically assess police enforcement policies, such policies "vary from place to
place and from time to time." Id. at 1775. The Court rejected the notion that search
and seizure protections should be so varied. See id. It is apparent that the Supreme
Court was concerned with the potential for widely disparate applications of the
Fourth Amendment. It is submitted that application of article I, section 12 of the
New York State Constitution similarly should not depend on which part of the state
one happens to commit a traffic infraction.
"See id. at 1777 ("[WMe are aware of no principle that would allow [the Court]
to decide at what point a code of law becomes so expansive and so commonly vio-
lated that infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of
enforcement.") (emphasis added).
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seems to be that, since most drivers commit only minor traffic in-
fractions, the Whren decision gives the police carte blanche to
stop and search any vehicle at any time.47 Prior New York
precedent, however, seems to provide adequate protection
against such arbitrary searches.48 Under the standards set forth
by these cases, a search or seizure that extends beyond what is
required by the exigent circumstances is deemed unreasonable
and a violation of the motorist's constitutional rights.4 9 Addi-
tionally, any argument that police may enforce the traffic code in
a discriminatory manner is sufficiently addressed by other con-
stitutional provisions."
47 See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners at 21, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct.
1769 (1996) (No. 95-5841) (discussing police officers who admitted following drivers
until traffic violation was committed so search could be conducted).
" See People v. Banks, 85 N.Y.2d 558, 562, 650 N.E.2d 833, 835, 626 N.Y.S.2d
986, 988 (stating that to be constitutional, traffic stop must be justified and rea-
sonably related in scope to circumstances justifying detention in first instance), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 187 (1995); People v. Howell, 49 N.Y.2d 778, 779, 403 N.E.2d 182,
182, 426 N.Y.S.2d 477, 478 (1980) (holding that erratic driving was not enough to
justify ensuing police search); People v. Erwin, 42 N.Y.2d 1064, 1065, 369 N.E.2d
1170, 1171, 399 N.Y.S.2d 637, 638-39 (1977) (holding search invalid because not in-
cident to arrest for traffic infraction); People v. Troiano, 35 N.Y.2d 476, 478, 323
N.E.2d 183, 185, 363 N.Y.S.2d 943, 945 (1974) (suggesting that circumstances allow-
ing arrest may not justify search where arrest was not necessary because alterna-
tive summons was available); People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98, 100, 228 N.E.2d 783,
785, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789, 791 (1967) ("There is no question, and the entire court
agrees, that a police officer is not authorized to conduct a search every time he stops
a motorist for speeding or some other ordinary traffic infraction."); People v. Rose,
125 A.D.2d 727, 728-29, 509 N.Y.S.2d 894, 895 (2d Dep't 1986) (indicating that
driver should be issued summons and allowed to leave where situation does not es-
calate beyond traffic infraction); cf People v. Ellis, 62 N.Y.2d 393, 397, 465 N.E.2d
826, 828, 477 N.Y.S.2d 106, 108 (1984) (holding search of car, upon arrest of driver
for traffic infraction, valid pursuant to probable cause).
4' In the Banks case, the court held that the observed seat belt violations in-
volved did not justify the length of the ensuing detention. Banks, 85 N.Y.2d at 562,
650 N.E.2d at 835, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 988. Once the license and stolen vehicle radio
checks came back negative, the defendants should have been released, rendering
subsequently discovered evidence of drug violations inadmissible. Id. The Marsh-
Troiano-Howell line of cases, however, clearly indicate that police officers may con-
duct searches when necessary to ensure officer safety. See Troiano, 35 N.Y.2d at
480, 323 N.E.2d at 186, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 946-47 (Rabin, J., concurring). Even when
an arrest accompanies a violation of the traffic law, the police are constrained to the
permissible scope of search. See id. Accordingly, at least in New York, the police
may not search an individual and his or her vehicle simply because a technical vio-
lation of the traffic code occurred. Banks, 85 N.Y.2d at 562, 650 N.E.2d at 835, 626
N.Y.S.2d at 998.
"0 See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774 (stating that Equal Protection Clause, not
Fourth Amendment, is appropriate constitutional basis for objecting to selective en-
forcement of law by police officers).
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"There is a real tension in our society between the need for
more effective police work to combat the rising tide of crime and
our constitutional aversion to a police state .. The tension
requires society to strike a balance between its citizens security
and liberty. This balance is upset when officers are required to
have impeccable thoughts in addition to impeccable actions.
While the state is the primary guarantor of individual liberties,52
judges should be cautious and should engage in comprehensive
analysis before extending state constitutional protections.53 De-
spite New York's tradition of providing substantially more pro-
tection under its constitution than is afforded by the Federal
Constitution,' the Williams decision sets a dangerous precedent
in providing overly broad protection when the Supreme Court's
guidance adequately protects New Yorkers from unconstitutional
searches and seizures.
Seth D. Amera
5 ZARR, supra note 3, at 1; see People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 418-19, 330
N.E.2d 39, 43, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67, 73 (1975) (suggesting that reasonableness for stop
requires balancing of state and individual interests).
52 See Kaye, supra note 8, at 407-08 (discussing Justice Stevens' reprimand of
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for basing decision on federal, rather than
state, constitutional grounds) (referring to Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727,
737 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
6 See People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 301-03, 501 N.E.2d 556, 559-60,
508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 911-12 (1986) (discussing proper methodology for determining
whether state constitutions should provide greater protection than Federal Consti-
tution). See generally Vito J. Titone, State Constitutional Interpretation: The Search
for an Anchor in a Rough Sea, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 431 (1987) (discussing various
methods of state constitution interpretation). 'The importance of careful analysis in
state constitutional adjudication cannot be overemphasized. Cases decided solely on
state constitutional grounds are absolutely shielded from federal review .... Thus,
an ill-considered decision ... may nonetheless continue to influence legal relation-
ships indefinitely." Id. at 438-39.
4 See Titone, supra note 53, at 465-66.

